In a report published on November 19, 2026, at 20:24 UTC+8, TechFlow said an attacker drained approximately $3.4 million in liquidity from K3 Capital’s Ethereum-based sBOLD savings vault. The reported exploit involved 97 transactions over roughly eight minutes, an average loss of about $425,000 per minute.
How the vault was exploited
sBOLD is a yield-bearing vault built around BOLD, the stablecoin associated with Liquity. According to Bitquery’s reconstruction, the attacker exploited how the vault accounted for assets transferred into it. Within a transaction, the attacker repeatedly deposited BOLD, introduced wrapped ether (WETH) that was not reflected on the balance sheet, and exchanged it internally for BOLD. This raised the apparent redemption value of each sBOLD share, allowing withdrawals at an inflated valuation that drew on other depositors’ funds.

Where the proceeds went
Bitquery said automated bots detected the original attacker’s withdrawal transaction in the mempool, copied and changed its parameters, and got ahead of it. The bots extracted about $1.91 million, or 56.18% of the reported $3.4 million total. They paid approximately $1.78 million in priority fees to block builders to win transaction ordering, leaving about $130,000—6.81% of the amount they extracted—as net arbitrage proceeds.
TechFlow reported that Titan built most blocks containing the competing transactions, with BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar also involved in ordering related blocks. On-chain researchers cautioned that the $1.78 million was gross fee revenue for builders, not necessarily their profit: builders still had to bid for blocks proposed by beacon-chain validators through MEV-Boost. The report put the original attacker’s and initial funding wallet’s combined net proceeds at approximately $520,000.
Audit question and response
ChainSecurity audited sBOLD in May 2025 and warned in its report of a path to extract excess value through self-liquidation, according to TechFlow. Whether this attack used that mechanism remained under investigation at the time of the November 19 report.
The report said the team was working with tracing firms to monitor cross-chain fund movements while assessing depositor losses and repairing the vault code. It also identified restricting transfers of non-allowlisted tokens, limiting redemptions per block and using time-weighted price oracles as potential defenses for ERC-4626-style vaults. Those are described as safeguards, not as changes already deployed to sBOLD or requirements of ERC-4626.
